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Italy has seen a ﬂurry of reforms during the 1990s, and economists and
policymakers are still struggling to assess their immediate results as well as
their long-term eﬀects. Many analysts argue that the overall design of the
recent Italian reforms is probably good, yet more steps need to be taken to
speed up the reform process and reap the beneﬁts, which, due to the ad-
verse demographic trends, could easily evaporate.
In this chapter, we contribute to the current debate on the Italian pen-
sion system by analyzing the impact of social security reforms, in terms of
both their budgetary implications and their distributional eﬀects. This is
done by simulating the eﬀects of three hypothetical reforms, plus the eﬀects
of the 1995 reform of the Italian pension system (the so-called Dini re-
form). Our approach relies on the use of a semistructural econometric
model to predict retirement probabilities under diﬀerent policy scenarios,
so as to properly take into account the behavioral eﬀects of the reforms. On
the basis of the estimated retirement model, we develop a complete ac-
counting exercise that includes not only changes in gross future beneﬁts
due to policy changes, but also changes in social security contributions, in-
come taxes, and value-added taxes. Thus, our results provide not only esti-
mates of the workers’ gains or losses, but also an exhaustive evaluation of
the gains and losses for the government budget.
We ﬁnd that the reforms, particularly the Dini reform (once fully phased
in), have a substantial impact on individuals’ retirement decisions and
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ﬁnances.
6.2 An Overview of the Italian Pension System and Its Reforms
Before turning to the analysis of diﬀerent social security reforms, it is
useful to brieﬂy describe the reform process that has taken place in Italy,
and the recent developments in the political arena. The growing concern of
the European Union (EU) with meeting the targets imposed by the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact has stimulated a debate on the eﬀects of the recent re-
forms and the need for further reforms. It should be mentioned that Italy,
along with the other member states of the EU, committed itself to a ﬁve-
year increase of the eﬀective retirement age by the year 2010. Speciﬁc tar-
gets have also been set on participation rates of older workers.
Many argue that the changes introduced during the 1990s may be inad-
equate in the light of future demographic trends, and that it is imperative
to raise the eﬀective retirement age. Empirical work carried out on the is-
sue shows that there is a strong relationship between the tax incentives to
retire and the age at which men are observed to actually retire in diﬀerent
countries.1For Italy, we still observe a substantial number of earlyretirees.2
Therefore, an evaluation of the impact and eﬃcacy of the reforms, which
has already started with the 2001 MinisterialCommittee3appointed by the
Italian Welfare Ministry, is of crucial importance.
The reforms of the 1990s have tackled several aspects of the Italian social
security system, but three are particularly relevant: (1) beneﬁt computation
rules, (2) indexation rules, and (3) retirement age and eligibility criteria.4 It
is useful to recall that the vast majority of the population is insured with the
National Institute for Social Security (INPS), and since this chapter fo-
cuses attention on the most important fund administered by the INPS, the
Private Sector Employees Fund (FPLD), our description of the reforms
will mainly focus on the changes aﬀecting private sector employees.
A ﬁrst reform (known as the Amato reform) was passed by Parliament in
1992. Once phased in, it would reduce pension outlays and iron out major
diﬀerences between various sectors and occupations. However, this reform
only marginally changed the rules governing early retirement and, accord-
ing to many, did not produce the much-needed savings in the budget. Hence
the second reform (the so-called Dini reform) of 1995. This reform totally
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1. The concept of an implicit tax was introduced by Gruber and Wise (1999).
2. See Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) and Brugiavini, Peracchi, and Wise (2003).
3. Relazione Finale della Commissione Ministeriale di “Veriﬁca del sistema previdenziale
ai sensi della legge 335/95 e successivi provvedimenti, nell’ottica della competitività, dello
sviluppo e dell’equità.”
4. For a description of the Italian social security system before 1992, see Brugiavini (1999),
Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004), and Franco (2002).changed some of the basic rules for granting beneﬁts to future retirees, and
tried to harmonize the actuarial rates of return for early and late retirees.
Table 6.1 summarizes some of the key features of three regimes: the regime
prevailing before the Amato reform (denoted as pre-1993 regime), the one
prevailing during the transition (currently in place), and the one prevailing
with the Dini reform fully in place (post-1995 regime). However, both the
Amato and the Dini reforms are characterized by a very long transitional
period aﬀecting all cohorts of post-1992 retirees: the provisions for the tran-
sitional periods involve a pro rata method of establishing eligibility and ben-
eﬁt computation criteria on the basis of seniority.
6.2.1 The Dini Reform and Recent Assessments of the Reform Process
The Dini reform adopts a notionally deﬁned-contribution method of
beneﬁt calculation. The initial pension amount is the annuity equivalent to
the present value (at retirement) of past payroll taxes, capitalized by means
of a ﬁve-year moving average of nominal GDP growth rates. The relevant
payroll tax rate is 33 percent, and an age-related actuarial adjustment fac-
tor is applied to the resulting ﬁgure.5In this case, too, capping is applied on
the present value of contributions, rather than on pensionable earnings.
The 1995 reform introduced—at the steady state—a window of pension-
able ages with an associated actuarially based adjustment of pensions. This
window spans age 57 to 65, with actuarial adjustment factors of 4.720 per-
cent and 6.136 percent, respectively. These coeﬃcients make the present
value of future beneﬁts equal to capitalized contributions for people with
survival probabilities equal to those in the 1990 life tables. They should be
revised every ten years on the basis of changes in life expectancy and a
comparison of the rates of growth of GDP and taxable earnings. It should
be noted that, even at the steady state, the system will not achieve complete
age-neutrality, given the mortality prospects of Italian workers.6
Minimum contribution requirements changed from the initial ﬁfteen
years to just ﬁve years after 1995, while payroll taxes increased to 32.7 per-
cent of gross earnings (to be split between employer and employee), up
from approximately 27 percent in 1995.
The implementation of the reform was (and still is) extremely gradual.
Workers with at least eighteen years of contributions in 1995 will receive a
pension computed on the basis of the rules applying before 1992. Those
with less than eighteen years of contributions in 1992 will be subject to a
pro rata regime: the 1995 reform will apply only to the contributions paid
after 1995.7 Only individuals who began working after 1995 will receive a
Fiscal Implications of Pension Reforms in Italy 255
5. Hence the beneﬁt is: 33 percent   adjustment factor   present value of SS taxes.
6. See Barbi (2001).
7. The beneﬁts paid to individuals in the pro rata regime will be computed on the basis of































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































spension computed only on the basis of the new rules. Hence the length of
the transition phase, as well as other aspects of the reform, may signiﬁ-
cantly reduce its expected beneﬁts.
A ﬁrst round of evaluations of the reforms became available throughout
the 1990s. Some of these evaluations were based on generational account-
ing. For example, it was estimated that in order to ensure the long-term sus-
tainability of public ﬁnances, a 5 percent increase in taxes paid by all gen-
erations would be required. Without the pension reforms introduced in the
1990s, the required tax increase would have been 9 percent. About 40 per-
cent of those employed in 1999 could fully retire under the pre-1992 regime.
For these people, the incentive to retire early was actually increased by ex-
pectations that the retirement conditions might be tightened (Franco 2002).
The Report of the Ministerial Committee (2001) shows that the savings
obtained between 1996 and 2000 were essentially due to changes in the in-
dexation rules and curtailing early retirement. The diﬃculty in building a
complete evaluation model that incorporates behavioral responses to the
reforms relies on the availability of good data and on the overall approach.
Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) provide an econometric model that focuses
on dynamic incentives but does not address ﬁscal implications, while other
recent studies8 carry out accounting exercises that neglect the impact of
policy changes on the retirement decisions of individuals.
6.3 The Retirement Model
The simulation exercise carried out in the present chapter relies on an
econometric model of the retirement decisions of Italian workers based
largely on the work of Gruber and Wise (2004) and already applied to the
Italian case by Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004). In the present chapter, we
limit our description of the econometric work to the main features of our
modeling strategy and to the data. An important diﬀerence with respect to
Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) is the fact that the availability of a new re-
lease of the data, characterized by a larger sample size, allows us to follow
a novel approach. Therefore, the underlying empirical work also deserves
attention.
6.3.1 The Data
The retirement decision is analyzed through a reduced-form model, es-
timated on a random sample of administrative records from the Istituto
Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale (INPS) archives.9 The sample is drawn
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8. See Ministero dell’Economia (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato) 2001 and Fornero-
Castellino 2001.
9. This is a subsample of workers born either on March 1st or on October 1st of any pos-
sible year contained in the archive.from the so-called INPS Workers-Archive (Archive O1M), which contains
records on all private sector employees insured with INPS. The informa-
tion on each employee is entered by the employer on a standard form. Our
data consists of a random sample of about 200,000 workers entering the
archive at any time during the period 1973–1997, and was followed contin-
uously until they leave the sample. Employment spells can last any number
of years, and individuals who leave the sample may enter again in any sub-
sequent year. The panel is therefore highly unbalanced.
The main advantages of using these data are that they span a fairly long
time period and contain information on gross earnings, which form the ba-
sis for the calculation of social security beneﬁts. However, there are several
shortcomings.
1. The dataset only covers private sector employees, leaving out public
sector employees and the self-employed. Even for private sector employ-
ees, however, coverage is not full, and a small fraction of them is not in-
cluded.
2. The reason a worker drops oﬀ the archive is not known: in addition
to retiring, workers could die, become self-employed or public sector em-
ployees, or simply stop working.
3. Important covariates (e.g., education level, spousal information, and
other family background variables) are missing. As a result, we have very
few demographic controls available, we do not know about marital status,
and we cannot say much about diﬀerential mortality.
4. There is no information on receipt of disability or other types of ben-
eﬁts.
The initial sample selection is as follows. We focus on workers between
18 and 70 years of age who work at least 28 days a year. We exclude from
the analysis workers belonging to special INPS funds (nursery-school
teachers, local authorities employees, etc.).10
6.3.2 Earnings Projection and Transitions to Retirement
The speciﬁcation of a model for the age-earnings proﬁle represents an
essential step in the estimation of social security wealth at the individual
level. This is especially important in Italy, as the process of social security
reform involves moving from a ﬁnal salary type of beneﬁt formula (pre-
1993 system) to a formula based on the value of lifetime contributions
(1995 reform).11 In the following we describe additional hypothetical re-
forms, which also involve extending the beneﬁt calculation period.
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10. We could include these observations to add variability across funds, but these workers
represent only a small number (less than 100 observations) and tend to exhibit many gaps in
their careers.
11. In this and in the following sections we only describe results for the 1995 reform (results
for the other cases are available on request from the authors).In order to estimate earnings proﬁles and eventually measure social se-
curity wealth, we further select the sample by including only workers who
are present in the sample for an uninterrupted period of at least ﬁve years
(workers often appear for one year and then disappear from the sample for
a long spell). The ﬁve-year minimum requirement is activated by the fact
that this corresponds to the minimum contributive period under the 1995
reform. We only keep workers who do not have substantial gaps (more
than ten years missing) in their records. This is because we cannot say
whether in that time span they were engaged in other labor market or non-
labor market activities (such as maternity leaves, or undertaking further
education). The choice of a ten-year interval is arbitrary, and is based on a
preliminary inspection of the data.12
The information available to model age-earnings proﬁles in the INPS
sample is somewhat limited, for it consists only of age, gender, occupation,
sector of employment, and region of working activity.13
The earnings-modeling strategy is as follows: individual real age-
earnings proﬁles are modeled with individual ﬁxed eﬀects in order to ﬁll
gaps of one or two years in workers’ careers. The earnings proﬁle is as-
sumed to be completely ﬂat after the last year of observed earnings. This
corresponds to the assumption that, at the individual level, the real earn-
ings process is a random walk, with no drift. In practice, the jump-oﬀpoint
for the earnings projections is taken to be the average of the last three years
of observed earnings. This jump-oﬀ point pins down the level of the age-
earnings proﬁle for each individual.14 Note that this might lead to under-
estimating future earnings growth, particularly for younger cohorts. How-
ever, since our “sample at risk” (as deﬁned in the following) consists mainly
of older cohorts, the problem may not be too severe.15 Furthermore, for
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12. It should be noted that in order to gain variability in social security beneﬁts, we did ex-
periment with a larger sample that included almost all workers, regardless of the existence of
gaps in their careers. However, this did not add valuable information, as the majority of work-
ers with substantial spells out of the private sector would end up qualifying for minimum ben-
eﬁts (the level of which is ﬁxed by legislation each year) or for an old-age income guarantee
(pensione sociale). Hence there would be very little correlation between earnings histories and
pension beneﬁts for these individuals, and the eﬀects of potential reforms in changing the in-
centives to retire would be negligible (these workers would basically qualify for the minimum
beneﬁt under all regimes). Therefore these cases would end up blurring the results rather than
adding variability to be exploited. Finally, our choice of the ten years’ threshold and the re-
quirement of a minimum of ﬁve years’ presence in the archive give us an estimated sample per-
centage of minimum beneﬁt recipients that is not too far from what was observed in the uni-
verse of pension awards as recorded by the INPS Administration.
13. This is actually the region where the ﬁrm is located. Hence a comparison with the SHIW
and national accounts data reveals that there seems to be a higher number of workers located
in the northwest, where many large ﬁrms have their headquarters.
14. When going backward, the jump-oﬀ point corresponds to the average of the ﬁrst three
observations available for each individual.
15. The cohorts at risk are deﬁned according to year of birth: for the oldest cohort these
are between 1918 and 1926, for the next cohort 1927–36, and for the youngest cohort,
1937–44.those above 50, earnings are lower on average and are very noisy, possibly
because of part-time work or the coexistence of early retirement beneﬁts
and working activities. If one looked backward, using a ﬂat earnings pro-
ﬁle would grossly overestimate the level of earnings at earlier ages and
grossly underestimate real earnings growth. To avoid this problem, indi-
vidual earnings are assumed to grow at the annual growth rate of aggregate
earnings, for the years when this information is available, and at a constant
real rate of 1.5 percent otherwise.16
Notice that, although our ﬁrst data point is in 1973, we need to go back
to the 1930s for some of our workers in order to complete their working his-
tory. Hence, we are forced to use a procedure that makes use of aggregate
growth rates when projecting backward into the distant past. Also, in pro-
jecting earnings forward, individuals are assumed to form expectations by
using the model. In other words, for each age we only use actual earnings
up to that age, and project earnings from that age forward according to the
forecasting model.
Our data contain no information on the reasons why workers leave the
archive. Thus, in order to use the data, we make the strong assumption that
every exit from the archive is due to retirement. In fact, rather than retir-
ing, a worker could have died, or moved from private sector employment
to public sector employment or to self-employment. Our identifying as-
sumption is that, over the range of ages that we consider (age 50 to 65), exit
from the INPS archive is due to retirement, not to other reasons. This as-
sumption is not in contrast with what we observe in an alternative sample
provided by the Bank of Italy (Survey of Household Income and Wealth
[SHIW]), where we have the full set of information available concerning the
occupational status of individuals in each year.17 As for mortality, in the
simulation we purge the exits of the component that can be attributed to
diﬀerential mortality by age, sex, and cohort.
For Italian workers, the only relevant alternative escape route from the
labor force is disability. Although other bridging plans exist, they would all
fall in the category of preretirement or early retirement and, in our data,
would eﬀectively correspond to retirement. We argue that exits via disabil-
ity are not particularly relevant to our sample because, after the changes
legislated in 1984, the importance of this escape route has greatly dimin-
ished and, in the age range that we consider (50 to 70), the number of dis-
ability pensions is negligible relative to old-age pensions.18
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16. Aggregate earnings are equal to the earnings series put together by Rossi, Sorgato, To-
niolo (1993) for the years before 1970 and to national account statistics for subsequent years
up to 1999.
17. In the SHIW sample, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of pensioner are available, based on self-
reported occupational status, on earnings, and on beneﬁts receipts. However, no marked
diﬀerence in the distribution of retired people by age emerged from adopting diﬀerent deﬁni-
tions.
18. See Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) for a more detailed discussion.Figure 6.1 presents the nonparametric retirement hazard based on the
INPS sample for men and women. For men there is an important spike at
age 60, but the hazard is not ﬂat at younger ages, whereas for women there
are several important ages at which the conditional probability of leaving
the labor force peaks.
6.3.3 Deﬁnition of Social Security Wealth and Incentive Measures
Key elements of our econometric model are the concepts of social secu-
rity wealth and related dynamic incentives. It is useful to brieﬂy recap these
concepts.
For a worker of age a, we deﬁne social security wealth (SSW) in case of
retirement at age h   a as the expected present value of future pension
beneﬁts




where Sis the age of certain death (110 years),  s   s–a sis a discount fac-
tor that depends on the rate of time discount   and the survival probabil-
ity  s at age s conditional on being alive at age h, and B(h) is the pension
beneﬁt expected at age s h 1 in case of retirement at age h. Pension ben-
eﬁts are the net of income taxes. Given SSW, we deﬁne three incentive mea-
sures for a worker of age a.
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Fig. 6.1 Empirical hazard from the INPS sample1. Social security accrual (SSA) is the diﬀerence in SSW due to post-
poning retirement from age a to age a   1.
SSAa   SSW a 1   SSW a  ∑
S
s a 2
 s[Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)]    a 1Ba 1(a).
The SSA is negative if the expected present value of pension beneﬁts for-
gone by postponing retirement by one year is greater than ΣS
s a 2 s[Bs(a  
1) – Bs(a)], the expected present value of the increment in the ﬂow of future
pension beneﬁts. The rescaled negative accrual  a   –SSAa/W a 1, where
W a 1 are expected net earnings at age a  1 based on the information avail-
able up to age a, is called the implicit tax/subsidy of postponing retirement
from age a to age a   1.
2. Peak value: PV a   maxh(SSW h – SSW a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where R is
the mandatory retirement age (the latter does not exist in Italy, but given
the retirement evidence we ﬁnd it reasonable to put R 70). Thus, the peak
value is the maximum diﬀerence in SSW between retiring at future ages
and retiring at the current age.
3. Option value: OVa   maxh(V h – V a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where




is the intertemporal expected utility of retiring at age a, while








is the intertemporal utility of retiring at age h   a. Thus, the option value
is the maximum utility diﬀerence between retiring at future ages and retir-
ing at age a. We parameterize the model by assuming   1 and k   1.25.
Under these assumptions, V a   1.25SSW a and




    1.25SSW h.
If expected earnings are constant at W a(as assumed in our earnings model),
then
V h   V a   W a ∑
h
s a 1
 s   1.25(SSW h   SSW a).
That is, the peak value and the option value are proportional to each other,
except for the eﬀect due to the term Σh
s a 1 s.
In the actual calculation of SSW, we assume a time discount factor of 1.5
percent (  .985). Beneﬁts are deﬁned in real terms, and the indexation
rules prevailing under each legislation are implemented (e.g., in the base-
line we apply indexation to both price inﬂation and real wages). We also
262 Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchiassume that real earnings growth after 1997 (the last year of the INPS
sample) is constant at 1.5 percent.
Estimation of SSW is carried out separately for men and women. House-
hold social security wealth is set equal to the man’s social security wealth
when the wife does not work. In estimating the model, we must deal with
the fact that the actual age of entry into the labor market is not always
known. We used the information on the initial occupational level to get a
reasonable proxy for educational attainments. This is then used to impute
an initial age for a worker’s contributive history.
Eligibility and beneﬁt computation rules prevailing under each regime
are rather complex (see section 6.2), and some shortcuts were made. Fi-
nally, we computed social security wealth net of income tax, by subtracting
income tax from gross pension beneﬁts.
6.3.4 The Reduced-Form Retirement Model: 
Methodology and Estimation Results
In this section, we present the results of modeling exit into retirement us-
ing probit models that include, in addition to a standard set of covariates
(such as age, occupation, and sector of employment), the incentive mea-
sures discussed in the previous section.
The response variable is a binary indicator, representing exit from the
INPS sample between the year t and the year t   1. The population at risk
consists of workers aged between 50 and 70 in any of the relevant years. The
sample used for estimation includes all consecutive pairs of years from
1980 to 1981 through 1996 to 1997. We restrict the analysis to individuals
at risk after 1980. The reason is twofold: ﬁrst, it is very hard to capture the
behavior of workers, taking into account all of the institutional changes
aﬀecting the various cohorts over a long time span. The period 1980–1992
has the advantage of being relatively stable in terms of policy changes. Sec-
ond, because in some cases we have to model earnings proﬁles going back
ﬁfty years, given the existing limitations on aggregate wage data it is rea-
sonable to limit the time horizon to recent years. In this way, our oldest
worker is aged 70 in 1980, and we only need to back-cast earnings to the
year 1930.19
The social security regime is assumed to be the transitional one intro-
duced in 1992 (see table 6.1). This is the relevant regime for the workers in
our sample, who would not yet experience the changes introduced by the
1995 reform through the sample period. Overall, using the pre-1993 rules
would lead to negligible diﬀerences in terms of social security wealth and
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19. Retirement is not mandatory. Given that we assume an individual at risk up to age 70,
and given that we cannot exclude that she or he started working at age 20, we cannot rule out
the possibility that this individual worked for ﬁfty years.eligibility. This is because, as already mentioned, the rights of workers near
retirement were changed only marginally by the 1992 reform: according to
seniority, most workers at risk would fully retire under the pre-1993 rules.
For each incentive measure, two basic speciﬁcations are considered, for
a total of six estimated models. The incentive variables are the accrual, the
peak value, and the option value, whereas the dependence of the retire-
ment hazard on age is modeled either through a simple linear age term or
through a full set of age dummies. All speciﬁcations include a set of sec-
toral and regional indicators and a set of earnings measures relevant for
the retirement choice. Diﬀerent from our previous work, and from other
countries that contribute to this project, we only use two resource mea-
sures, capturing, respectively, the level of social security wealth and the
trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts and labor earnings: net social security wealth
and pensionable earnings.20 The additional variable, measuring future
earnings, which we included in previous studies, is left out, because in the
Italian case a multicollinearity problem emerges under the baseline and the
transitional period.21 The problem is caused by the way beneﬁts are com-
puted: pensionable earnings, which form the basis of our social security
wealth estimate, are equal to average earnings in the last ﬁve years, and in
many cases they take the same value of (or a very close value to) one-step-
ahead projected earnings.
Results for the speciﬁcation with age dummies are summarized in table
6.2: each column refers to a particular incentive variable and we report
only the estimated coeﬃcients of the variables of interest. It should be
noted that our purpose here is not to produce a good ﬁt, but rather to cre-
ate a basis for the simulation exercise by adopting a parsimonious speciﬁ-
cation.22The use of age dummies increases the ﬁt relative to the model with
a linear age term, but only marginally. This suggests that age is an impor-
tant determinant of retirement decisions but, despite the presence of spikes
in the hazard, we obtain only marginal gains by making use of a fully pa-
rameterized model. Hence, these spikes may be less important than ﬁrst
appears in explaining the age-retirement process, as most of the movement
comes from the exits taking place between age 50 and age 60. As shown in
table 6.2, the social security wealth variable and the incentive variables
have, by and large, the correct sign: of the three incentive variables, the ac-
crual and option value have the correct sign and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
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20. To be more precise, we use a quadratic polynomial in pensionable earnings. All contin-
uous variables enter in the form of deviation from the mean.
21. For brevity, we do not report the estimates of regressions of the future earnings variable
against social security wealth, pensionable earnings, and all the relevant covariates. This
regression shows the clear symptoms of multicollinearity; for example, an extremely high 
t-statistics for the two variables under investigation.
22. For example, if we used year-of-birth cohorts, results improve dramatically.6.4 Simulating Policy Changes
The aim of this section is to simulate the total ﬁscal implications of pen-
sion reforms. The hypothetical reforms, described later, contain some use-
ful elements for the debate currently taking place in Italy. For example, the
reform that we indicate as “actuarial adjustment” represents a change of
the current Italian system in line with what many experts and policy mak-
ers advocate. We also simulate the steady-state eﬀects of the actual reform
introduced in 1995 (the so-called Dini Reform).
6.4.1 Social Security Regimes
The baseline or reference regime (R0) is the social security system pre-
vailing before 1992; the various successive regime changes are evaluated
against this regime.23 As for the reforms considered, a brief description is
useful.
R1: Three-Year Reform
This reform preserves all the features of the system but increases by three
years the normal retirement age. Since in Italy all ages before the normal
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23. As we already pointed out, the econometric model that predicts retirement is estimated
on the sample of workers observed between 1974 and 1997, hence experiencing the transitional
period. In the estimation, we evaluate social security wealth and the incentive variables ac-
cording to the rules of the transitional phase, because these are the incentives actually faced by
individuals. However, in the simulation we look at changes occurring between steady states.
Table 6.2 Probit models of retirement decisions (with age dummies)
Accrual Peak value Option value
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
coeﬃcient error coeﬃcient error coeﬃcient error
Male: 20,092 observances
Social security 
wealth 0.00058 0.00025 0.00060 0.00028 0.00027 0.00028
Incentive –0.00103 0.00065 –0.00031 0.00063 –0.00099 0.00036
Constant –1.29995 0.04415 –1.32031 0.04738 –1.27715 0.04400
R2 0.0836 0.0835 0.0840
Log-likelihood –7054.7301 –7055.8927 –7052.1504
Female: 5,165 observances
Social security 
wealth 0.00063 0.00083 0.00157 0.00094 0.00002 0.00097
Incentive –0.00480 0.00474 0.00443 0.00312 –0.00210 0.00137
Constant –1.18974 0.06768 –1.209801 0.06881 –1.15935 0.07085
R2 0.0314 0.0316 0.0317
Log-likelihood –2029.3559 –2028.872 –2028.6804retirement age are potentially an early retirement age (conditional on sen-
iority), the entire hazard is eﬀectively shifted by three years. The seniority
rule is preserved in its original format (see also table 6.1).
R2: Actuarial Reform
This reform should achieve an actuarially fair system without changing
any other feature of the program (i.e., no change in basic beneﬁt calcula-
tion rules, in means testing and eligibility to minimum beneﬁts, and in in-
dexation). The normal retirement age is the same as the base case, and the
rules in place are unchanged at that age (hence, the replacement ratio is the
same at that age). The reform introduces an actuarial adjustment of 6 per-
cent for each year past the normal retirement age. Thus, beneﬁts becoming
available before the normal retirement age are reduced by 6 percent per
year, while beneﬁts becoming available after the normal retirement age are
increased by 6 percent per year.
R3: Common Reform
This reform is common to all countries considered in this volume. The
crucial feature is that, diﬀerent from the other cases, this reform envisages
an ideal system, the same for all countries, which represents a complete de-
parture from the systems currently in place in many countries (Italy is one
example). This simulation features an early retirement age of 60 and a nor-
mal retirement age of 65. It provides a retiree with a beneﬁt that replaces 60
percent of her or his projected earnings when she or he turns 65. It applies
an actuarial reduction of 6 percent per year for early claiming and an actu-
arial increase of 6 percent per year for later claiming. It essentially makes
early retirement costly and introduces age neutrality in retirement choices.
R4: The 1995 Reform
The 1995 reform adopts a notionally deﬁned contribution method of
beneﬁt calculation. The initial pension amount is the annuity equivalent to
the present value (at retirement) of past payroll taxes, capitalized by means
of a ﬁve-year moving average of the nominal GDP growth rate. The value
of the annuity is an increasing function of the age at retirement. It is equal
to 4.72 percent of the present value of past payroll taxes for people retiring
at age 57, and to 6.136 percent for people retiring at age 65 or older.24 Cap-
ping is applied (on the present value of contributions, rather than on pen-
sionable earnings).
6.4.2 Simulation Methodology
For each of the ﬁve policies described previously (four regime changes
plus the baseline) and for each worker in our ﬁnal sample, we estimate the
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24. Hence the beneﬁts is: 33 percent   adjustment factor   present value of SS taxes.social security wealth variable and the incentive measures. For each worker
we also observe a number of covariates, such as age, occupational status,
and so on. We simulate retirement decisions of these workers on the basis
of the econometric model described in section 6.3, using the social security
wealth variable and the incentive measures speciﬁc to each regime. All
other covariates are identical across simulations. In this way, retirement
probabilities change in response to changes in the policy variables accord-
ing to the estimated parameters (shown also in table 6.2). However, a few
adjustments are needed in order to adapt the estimates to the policy envi-
ronment. One of these adjustments concerns the age dummies. To recap,
we make use of two econometric models: one where age enters linearly and
is not aﬀected by the reform changes (S1), and one where age enters
through a set of age dummies (S3). The coeﬃcients on the age dummies of
this model are bound to be aﬀected by the reforms, over and above the
changes implied by any modiﬁcation in eligibility rules. For example, in
Italy, the hazard for men has a spike at age 60, which is the normal retire-
ment age for men under the baseline (R0). If the normal retirement age is
shifted by three years (regime R1), then the age eﬀect observed at age 60
should be felt at age 63, and the whole hazard should reﬂect the policy
change.
Simulations are carried out in two steps: the ﬁrst step generates retire-
ment probabilities under the diﬀerent scenarios, whereas the second step
computes the ﬁscal implications of the changes. In order to carry out the
exercise, we initially focus on a homogeneous group of workers by drawing
a simulation sample of 699 individuals (men and women) born in 1938,
1939, and 1940 from the original INPS sample.25 We disregard time diﬀer-
ences between these three cohorts and simply assume everybody to be age
50 in 1990. For these individuals, we have all the relevant information for
all ages between 50 and 70; that is, we follow them through these ages even
if some of them have eﬀectively retired in the original sample. The intuition
behind this procedure is to compute the direct ﬁscal eﬀects of the reforms
(the mechanical eﬀects) and the ﬁscal eﬀects due to changes in retirement
behavior (the behavioral eﬀects) as seen from the perspective of an indi-
vidual who reaches age 50 in 1990 and is considering whether to retire at
any future age.
6.4.3 Basic Assumptions
Unlike most other countries in this project, we assume that men are mar-
ried to women who do not work, while working women are single. Hence, so-
cial security wealth of men can be thought of as a household’s social security
wealth (men are head of the household). This assumption is introduced
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25. There are 235 workers in the 1938 cohort, 223 in the 1939 cohort, and 241 in the 1940
cohort.because our data contain no information on workers’ marital status, and in
the Italian legislation the only major diﬀerence between a single worker and
a married worker is eligibility to survivors’ pension (there is no dependent-
spouse beneﬁt26). We did not attempt an imputation procedure to assign
spouses to workers because this would generate a signiﬁcant amount of noise
while not adding much to the results.27
Disability beneﬁts have not been taken into account because multiple
exit routes are not relevant in the Italian case. Also, we do not account for
the lump-sum beneﬁt occurring at any separation between employer and
employee (the so-called TFR) because, as shown in Brugiavini (1999), this
lump-sum beneﬁt does not alter dynamic incentives and would not essen-
tially be aﬀected by the reforms.
To complete the simulation we need information on mortality rates and
labor force participation in the population. A full set of mortality rates for
each sex–age–cohort combination has been constructed by ﬁtting a
grouped-logit model with cohort ﬁxed eﬀects to the sex–age–cohort mor-
tality rates kindly provided by professor Graziella Caselli, of the Univer-
sity of Rome “La Sapienza,” and spanning the period 1974 to 1994. On the
basis of the mortality rates obtained in this way, and the projected proba-
bilities of exit from the labor force projected for each regime, we infer re-
tirement probabilities at each age between 50 and 70. We then apply to our
results an inﬂation factor that takes into account the fact that we initially
normalize the size of the cohort to 100 workers aged 50 in 1990. The inﬂa-
tion factor has been computed using data from the Italian Labor Force
Survey, distinguishing workers by age and sex.28
Finally, total ﬁscal eﬀects are evaluated, both as a percentage of gross
beneﬁts under the baseline regime (obtained directly from the simulation
exercise) and as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the
private sector. In the second case, since our sample is conﬁned to private
sector employees, we ﬁrst gross up the results obtained (total gain/loss
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26. There is a diﬀerence in the rebates on income tax and in the calculation of minimum
beneﬁt, particularly in the way means testing is carried out.
27. We have assigned to men a wife who is three years younger, so that in case of death she
is entitled to survivors’ beneﬁts. Doing so, and further assuming that women are single, leads
to three sources of errors: (a) we overestimate beneﬁts to survivors when workers are men, as
in reality some are single; (b) we underestimate household social security wealth, by assum-
ing that wives never work, and (c) we underestimate beneﬁts to survivors of working women.
We estimated from the SHIW survey that the probability of being married for a man of age 50
is 88 percent. Of these, only 35 percent have a working wife; hence we hope that the combi-
nation of overestimation and underestimation may cancel each other out. In any case, it
should be noted that none of the reforms changes the basic features of survivors’ beneﬁts.
28. This step is necessary in order to produce the total gain/loss. More precisely, in 1990 our
sample contains 699 workers born in 1938 to 1940, an average of 233 workers per annual co-
hort. According to the Labor Force Survey, the population of these cohorts is about 193,000
workers, of which 75 percent are men. Thus, one worker in our sample represents 193,000/233
  828 workers in the population. We then multiply our results by the inﬂation factor in order
to produce the eﬀects for the whole population.from the reform) for a single representative individual of the cohort, by
multiplying by the number of employees (men and women) in the private
sector belonging to that cohort.29 The result of this calculation is the ag-
gregate eﬀect of the reform, which is then divided by the level of GDP ob-
served in the year 2001 in the private sector (approximately 994 billion eu-
ros). It should be noted that GDP in the private sector represents more
than 80 percent of Italian GDP.
6.4.4 Computing Expected Beneﬁts and Fiscal Eﬀects
Fiscal eﬀects of the reforms are evaluated by computing the net present
value of pension expenditures for the cohort of people who are aged a in
year t (in our case, age 50 in 1990). We study an initial sample of workers
(whose number, N, is normalized to be 100) who can leave the labor force
through retirement or death. The whole exercise hinges on the deﬁnition of
expected total gross beneﬁt payments:




R(X)SSW si   psi
D(X)SSWsi
D]
for i   1, . . . N, where psi
R and psi
D are, respectively, the conditional proba-
bility of retirement and death at age a for individual i. In a general model,
both these probabilities would depend on observable characteristics X, but
in our model the retirement probability is individual speciﬁc (projected),
while the probability of death is imputed from external data and depends
only on sex and age. The terms SSW and SSWD represent the discounted
sum of future beneﬁts that would accrue to a worker if he or she was alive
and retired at each future age a, or to her or his survivor in case of death.30
Both are discounted at a 3 percent real discount rate.
A full evaluation of the ﬁscal eﬀects of the reforms requires a more gen-
eral approach to the social security budget than can be achieved by look-
ing at the Social Security Administration in isolation. Therefore, a more
general approach is required, both from the point of view of the workers
belonging to the cohort of interest and from the point of view of ﬁscal au-
thorities. As for the former, any change to the social security rules would
imply a change in retirement/labor supply decisions, which in turn may
aﬀect income tax revenue. The latter is easily explained by bearing in mind
that the Italian pension system is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
basis, and is systematically running a deﬁcit. Also, diﬀerent sources of
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29. As we said, we deal with the three year-of-birth cohorts as if the workers all belonged
to the same cohort. The number of employees in the private sector of the 1940 cohort (in fact,
an average of the 1938, 1939, and 1940 cohorts) is 193,000.
30. It should be noted that while in the econometric exercise we make use of net social se-
curity wealth (net of income taxes), in the simulation we proceed in two steps; ﬁrst, we com-
pute gross social security wealth, and then take oﬀ all taxes when aggregating for all individ-
uals.revenue should be taken into account, because pension outlays are ﬁ-
nanced partly through current contributions and partly through taxation
at large. Therefore, we cannot identify a speciﬁc item of the government
revenue to be earmarked to ﬁnance the social security budget deﬁcit. For
this reason, we compute the present value of future taxes that each worker
would pay conditional on work, retirement, or death.31 Looking from 
the perspective of a worker of age 50: for any future year that she works,
she pays social security contributions plus income taxes plus VAT; if she
retires, she pays income tax on gross beneﬁts and VAT; if she dies, her
spouse will pay income tax and VAT on survivors’ beneﬁts. Therefore, for
any additional year of work, the value of contributions typically grows
(due also to a progressive income tax schedule), while the value of gross
beneﬁts may increase or decrease depending on eligibility and the rules of
the system.
After computing the present value of gross beneﬁts and total taxes for
each individual, we select the proper weights (which are based on labor
force data and depend on individuals’ age and sex) and obtain total pro-
jected beneﬁts and taxes for that cohort. Hence we can easily compute to-
tal net expected beneﬁts.
These calculations are carried out for each regime. The ﬁnal step is to
compute gains and losses by taking the diﬀerence of total net beneﬁts be-
tween each diﬀerent regime (R1, R2, R3, and R4) and the baseline (R0).
The simple diﬀerence between the two net quantities provides the total
eﬀects of the reform:















where R1 stands for the ﬁrst regime (or any of the reforms), R0 stands for
the baseline regime, and NTSW indicates the present value of total net
beneﬁts. We can also compute the mechanical eﬀect and the behavioral
eﬀect of the reforms as follows:






























The mechanical eﬀect freezes the retirement probabilities at the prereform
values, so that the only changes are due to changes of the social security
rules. The behavioral eﬀect maintains the same value for the net expected
beneﬁts (values after the reform), but changes the probabilities according
to the regime under evaluation.
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31. A detailed description of the assumptions regarding the tax base and tax rates is given
in the appendix.6.5 Results
Results are better described by looking separately at each regime
change, so that we can discuss the simulation strategy implemented in each
speciﬁc case. An overall summary of the results is provided in table 6.3and
table 6.4. The former shows the total ﬁscal impact of the three reforms, R1,
R2, and R3, whereas the latter decomposes these total eﬀects into me-
chanical and behavioral eﬀects. It should be noted that, although the re-
sults are presented as total eﬀects for workers born between 1938 and 1940,
the unit of analysis is really the household. To be more precise, given our
assumptions on marital status, we essentially describe a stylized economy
of married male workers (in which case we have household social security
wealth) and single female workers. For brevity, in this section we only com-
ment on results obtained using the option value as the incentive variable.
The full set of results can be found in tables 6.3 and 6.4, and in the corre-
sponding ﬁgures (ﬁgure 6.3 through 6.28). The total eﬀects given in these
tables have been obtained by aggregating the individual with weights given
by the inﬂation factors described previously in section 6.4. Because, as we
shall argue, the econometric speciﬁcation based on the linear term does
not provide a good representation of the behavior of Italian workers, we fo-
cus our attention on the model based on age dummies.32
R1: Three-Year Reform
This reform entails a shift of the hazard by three years, while all other
features of the social security system are preserved as under the baseline.
The reform has a direct eﬀect on the hazard and an indirect eﬀect on ben-
eﬁts through eligibility. It should be noted that when using the linear age
model, the projected age proﬁle of labor force exits does not accurately
capture the empirical hazard (ﬁgures 6.1 and 6.2): exits are evenly distrib-
uted over ages, and there is a hump around age 55 (ﬁgure 6.3). Instead, the
empirical hazard shows higher variability and marked spikes at ages 55 and
60 (ﬁgure 6.1). Furthermore, the age distribution by age of retirement rates
is essentially unaﬀected by the reform (ﬁgure 6.3). This is because the lin-
ear term does not pick up any of the policy changes, and as a result the be-
havioral eﬀect is negligible.
For the model with a linear age term, the present value of beneﬁts is re-
duced by 11.40 percent relative to the baseline value. Because taxes are also
reduced by the reform, the total net change is –9.5 percent (table 6.3). Most
of the impact of the reform is due to the mechanical eﬀect (–9.6 percent).
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32. Also, it should be noted that after age 66 there are very few workers left in the dataset,
so that the estimated hazard is very volatile. We decided to set the hazard of exits (for retire-
ment or death) equal to 0.5 after age 66 and equal to 1 at the latest age (69). The value 0.5
emerges as the estimated value at age 65, which is the last age that we have a reasonable sample
size available.The behavioral eﬀect, albeit very small, runs opposite to what one would
expect (0.1 percent), because retirement probabilities are higher at younger
ages after the reform, and precisely at those ages losses would be greater
(table 6.4 and ﬁgure 6.4). As for distributional eﬀects, table 6.5 shows that
losses are evenly spread over the population: people next to the highest
quintile (quintile 4) suﬀer most from the reform, but the loss in terms of net
present value of beneﬁts is not much higher than for the population at
large.
For the model with age dummies, which is documented in ﬁgures 6.5
through 6.9, retirement probabilities are much closer to the empirical haz-
ard; this is clearly shown by the age distribution of labor force exits (ﬁgure
272 Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
Table 6.3 Total ﬁscal impact of reforms
Present discounted value Total change relative to base (%)
Three-Year Actuarial Common Three-Year Actuarial Common
Base Reform Reform Reform Reform Reform Reform
Peak value—Linear age
Beneﬁts 168,752 148,332 141,059 62,376 –12.10 –16.41 –63.04
Taxes
Payroll 31,869 31,481 32,562 33,379 –1.22 2.17 4.74
Income 25,301 23,464 20,812 12,806 –7.26 –17.74 –49.39
VAT 16,873 15,425 15,299 10,128 –8.58 –9.33 –39.98
Total 74,042 70,370 68,673 56,313 –4.96 –7.25 –23.94
Peak value—Age dummies
Beneﬁts 168,016 141,632 142,282 63,683 –15.70 –15.32 –62.10
Taxes
Payroll 32,398 37,133 33,375 33,549 14.62 3.02 3.55
Income 25,847 25,771 22,083 13,686 –0.29 –14.56 –47.05
VAT 16,879 15,731 15,448 10,186 –6.80 –8.48 –39.65
Total 75,124 78,635 70,906 57,422 4.67 –5.61 –23.56
Option value—Linear age
Beneﬁts 168,002 148,856 142,463 61,972 –11.40 –15.20 –63.11
Taxes
Payroll 32,730 32,555 32,874 32,876 –0.53 0.44 0.45
Income 25,607 23,955 21,044 12,415 –6.45 –17.82 –51.52
VAT 16,959 15,633 15,457 10,031 –7.82 –8.86 –40.85
Total 75,296 72,143 69,375 55,322 –4.19 –7.86 –26.53
Option value—Age dummies
Beneﬁts 166,778 142,067 145,207 65,357 –14.82 –12.93 –60.81
Taxes
Payroll 33,387 38,048 35,399 35,079 13.96 6.03 5.07
Income 26,214 26,271 24,031 14,747 0.22 –8.33 –43.74
VAT 16,949 15,905 15,907 10,515 –6.16 –6.15 –37.96
Total 76,549 80,223 75,337 60,341 4.80 –1.58 –21.17






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Fig. 6.2 Empirical survival curve in the INPS sample
Fig. 6.3 Three-Year Reform—Option value, distribution of age of labor force exit
(OV linear age)
Note: Figures in percentage terms.6.5).33 The reform clearly aﬀects retirement behavior: the distribution of
retirement rates is shifted toward older ages, and the spikes are observed to
occur with three years’ delay. This implies that while a substantial fraction
of losses are suﬀered at ages 50 to 57, they tend to be very high at ages 55
and 60 (the normal retirement age of women and men under the baseline).
Older retirees would instead gain from the reform, because of the increase
in beneﬁts at older ages.
When the econometric model allows for age dummies, we not only ob-
serve a decline in beneﬁts (–14.82 percent relative to the baseline), but also
an increase in the overall ﬁscal impact (4.80 percent), so that the total net
eﬀect is –17.0 percent (table 6.3 and ﬁgures 6.8 and 6.9). This is largely due
to the mechanical eﬀect, although, as shown in table 6.4 and ﬁgure 6.7, a
nonnegligible role is played by the behavioral eﬀect (–7.7 percent). Note that
ﬁgure 6.7 reports the results as a percentage of private-sector GDP: these are
small (the total eﬀect is approximately –0.5 percent), but one should bear in
mind that social security spending is approximately 14 percent of total GDP
in Italy. In this sense, the implied saving for the budget may be nonnegligi-
ble. The distributional eﬀects of the reform are signiﬁcant, with the highest
quintile of social security wealth suﬀering a loss of approximately 20 percent
against a 12.4 percent loss at the lowest quintile (table 6.6). Hence, accord-
ing to this model, a reform that shifts the retirement age by three years in
Italy would be eﬀective in reducing outlays and would also be progressive.
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33. Besides changing the eligibility rules, we increment all age dummies by three years, so
that the normal retirement age is eﬀectively increased by three years.
Fig. 6.4 Three-Year Reform—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV
linear age)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.R2: Actuarial Reform
The basic idea of this reform is to preserve the status quo in several re-
spects as well as to introduce an actuarial adjustment in order to guaran-
tee neutrality of the system with respect to the retirement age. Before de-
scribing the results in detail, it is useful to remind the reader that the
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Table 6.5 Distribution analysis: Option value—Model with linear age
Present discounted value
Change relative to base PDV
Three-Year Actuarial Common
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common Reform Reform Reform
Quintile 5 (highest)
Beneﬁts 13,163 11,516 10,583 4,628 –1,647 –2,580 –8,535
After-tax income 11,883 10,486 10,096 5,162 –1,396 –1,787 –6,721
Taxes
Payroll 3,478 3,448 3,415 3,386 –30 –64 –92
Income 4,194 3,929 3,356 2,301 –264 –837 –1,893
VAT 1,338 1,230 1,200 825 –108 –139 –514
Total 9,010 8,607 7,971 6,512 –403 –1,040 –2,499
Net change –1,244 –1,540 –6,036
Change as % of
base beneﬁts –9.45 –11.70 –45.86
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 10,603 9,281 8,336 3,081 –1,322 –2,268 –7,522
Taxes: Total 4,378 4,161 3,893 3,009 –217 –485 –1,369
Net change –1,105 –1,783 –6,153
Change as % of
base beneﬁts –10.43 –16.81 –58.03
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 8,466 7,543 7,240 2,786 –923 –1,226 –5,680
Taxes: Total 2,788 2,693 2,737 2,119 –95 –51 –670
Net change –828 –1,175 –5,011
Change as % of
base beneﬁts –9.78 –13.88 –59.19
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 6,006 5,435 5,613 2,550 –572 –393 –3,457
Taxes: Total 1,779 1,734 1,855 1,454 –45 75 –325
Net change –526 –469 –3,132
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –8.76 –7.80 –52.14
Quintile 1 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 3,763 3,441 3,849 2,455 –322 86 –1,308
Taxes: Total 887 859 906 752 –28 19 –135
Net change –293 68 –1,173
Change as % of
base beneﬁts –7.80 1.80 –31.17
Note: Values in 2001 euros.Fig. 6.5 Three-Year Reform—Option value, distribution of age and labor force
exit (OV age dummies)
Note: Figures in percentage terms.
Fig. 6.6 Three-Year Reform—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV
age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.7 Three-Year Reform—Option value, ﬁscal implications of Three-Year
Reform as a percentage of GDPbaseline (pre-1993) is very far from being actuarially fair, as no actuarial
penalties are envisaged for early retirement (and no bonus for late retire-
ment).
As we already argued, the linear case is not very interesting for the Ital-
ian system. This can be easily understood by looking at ﬁgures 6.10 and
6.11, where a very smooth age proﬁle of exit probabilities is shown, which
is quite diﬀerent from the observed hazard.
Focusing one’s attention on ﬁgure 6.12, one can see that the Actuarial
Reform has some eﬀect on the age distribution of retirement probabilities.
In fact, although their basic pattern is unchanged after the reform, exits
from the labor force are lower at younger ages and higher at older ages.
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Fig. 6.8 Three-Year Reform—Option value, SSW by age of labor force exit (OV
age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.9 Three-Year Reform—Option value, taxes by age of labor force exit (OV
age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.Coupled with the actual reduction of beneﬁts that the reform envisages for
younger retirees (ﬁgure 6.13), this implies that gross beneﬁts are reduced (–
12.93 percent). Since total taxes are also marginally reduced (–1.58 per-
cent), the net eﬀect is –12.1 percent of baseline gross beneﬁts (table 6.3 and
table 6.4). The eﬀect is largely due to the actual reduction in beneﬁts; that
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Table 6.6 Distribution analysis: Option value—model with age dummies
Present discounted value
Change relative to base PDV
Three-Year Actuarial Common
Base Three-Year Actuarial Common Reform Reform Reform
Quintile 5 (highest)
Beneﬁts 13,185 11,078 11,100 5,344 –2,107 –2,085 –7,841
After-tax income 11,839 9,936 10,255 5,585 –1,904 –1,584 –6,255
Taxes
Payroll 3,550 4,103 3,879 3,980 553 329 430
Income 4,283 4,304 3,927 2,884 21 –356 –1,399
VAT 1,348 1,283 1,281 942 –65 –67 –406
Total 9,181 9,690 9,087 7,805 509 –94 –1,376
Net change –2,616 –1,991 –6,465
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –19.84 –15.10 –49.04
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 10,429 8,753 8,449 3,161 –1,677 –1,980 –7,269
Taxes: Total 4,474 4,638 4,166 3,118 164 –308 –1,356
Net change –1,841 –1,672 –5,912
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –17.65 –16.03 –56.69
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 8,344 7,159 7,271 2,777 –1,185 –1,073 –5,567
Taxes: Total 2,840 2,981 2,855 2,084 141 15 –757
Net change –1,326 –1,088 –4,810
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –15.90 –13.03 –57.65
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 5,970 5,212 5,613 2,559 –758 –356 –3,410
Taxes: Total 1,785 1,873 1,865 1,387 88 80 –397
Net change –846 –436 –3,013
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –14.18 –7.31 –50.47
Quintile 1 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 3,769 3,319 3,875 2,509 –450 106 –1,260
Taxes: Total 876 894 883 713 18 6 –163
Net change –468 99 –1,097
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –12.41 2.64 –29.11
Note: Values in 2001 euros.is, the mechanical component is prevalent (–11 percent), although the be-
havioral eﬀect goes in the expected direction (table 6.4 and ﬁgure 6.14). In
terms of private sector GDP, the revenue gains are of the order of 0.4 per-
centage points. The distributional eﬀects are interesting, both in terms of
age distribution and of welfare. Losses are concentrated in the age group
50 to 57, while gainers are retirees aged 58 to 69 (ﬁgure 6.15). A clear rank-
ing also emerges in terms of wealth distribution: the highest losses are su-
ﬀered by rich retirees (–15.1 percent and –16 percent respectively for the
5th and 4th quintiles of social security wealth), while the poor retirees gain
from this reform (table 6.6).
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Fig. 6.10 Actuarial Reform—Option value, distribution of age of labor force exit
(OV linear age)
Note: Values in percentage terms.
Fig. 6.11 Actuarial Reform—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV
linear age)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.R3: Common Reform
The Common Reform is a hypothetical reform that introduces very
diﬀerent rules from the ones currently in place in Italy. On average, bene-
ﬁts are lower: the gross replacement rate for a fully eligible Italian worker
is 80 percent at age 60 under the baseline, but would become 60 percent at
age 65 under the Common Reform. Penalties for early retirement are non-
existent under the baseline, but would be substantial under R3. One fur-
ther important diﬀerence is the indexation rule: in the pre-1993 system,
beneﬁts were indexed to nominal wages, while the Common Reform (as
well as the post-1993 regime) only indexes beneﬁts to prices. It should be
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Fig. 6.12 Actuarial Reform—Option value, distribution of age of labor force exit
(OV age dummies)
Note: Values in percentage terms.
Fig. 6.13 Actuarial Reform—Option value, SSW by age of labor force exit
Note: Values in euros of 2001.noted that in order to identify which speciﬁc feature of the reform pro-
duced the most important changes, we kept the legislation concerning cap-
ping and eligibility to minimum beneﬁts unchanged with respect to the
baseline (ﬁgures 6.16–6.18).
Figure 6.19 shows the distribution of labor force exits by age when use is
made of the model with age dummies.34 This reform reduces the exit rates
at younger ages and shifts their distribution toward older ages. Gross bene-
ﬁts are much lower at all ages, in particular between 50 and 60. Table 6.3
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34. The eﬀect of the age dummies estimated in the hazard of exits (to retirement and to
death) is slightly modiﬁed in this simulation to take account of the fact that we have implic-
itly moved the normal retirement age forward. Therefore, the age eﬀect observed at age 60
should be felt at age 65 after the reform. The change is done through a smoothing procedure.
Fig. 6.14 Actuarial Reform—Option value, ﬁscal implications of Actuarial Re-
form as a percentage of GDP
Fig. 6.15 Actuarial Reform—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV
age dummies)Fig. 6.16 Actuarial Reform—Option value, taxes by age of labor force exit
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.17 Common Reform—Option value, distribution of age of labor force exit
(OV linear age)
Note: Values in percentage terms.
Fig. 6.18 Common Reform—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV
linear age)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.Fig. 6.19 Common Reform—Option value, distribution of age in labor force exit
(OV age dummies)
Note: Values in percentage terms.
Fig. 6.20 Common Reform—Option value, ﬁscal implications of Common Re-
form as a percent of GDP
Fig. 6.21 Common Reform—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retirement (OV
age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.shows that, for all the reasons given earlier, the total impact on gross ben-
eﬁts is huge (–60.8 percent). However, taxes are also lower, particularly in-
come tax, so that the total net eﬀect with respect to baseline beneﬁts is –
51.1 percent. This is almost completely explained by the mechanical eﬀect
that swamps the small gain due to delayed retirement (table 6.4). As shown
in ﬁgure 6.20, the total eﬀect is quite sizeable in terms of GDP: the ﬁscal
authorities would gain approximately 1.6 percent of private sector GDP.
The largest losses are suﬀered by workers retiring at ages 55 and 60,
which are the normal retirement ages under the baseline. In general, the
bulk of the ﬁscal saving for the government comes from the age group 50
to 60 (ﬁgure 6.21). In terms of wealth distribution everyone loses from the
reform, but the median retiree (3rd quintile) appears to lose more, whereas
retirees placed at the lowest quintile suﬀer the smallest loss (table 6.7).
R4: The Dini Reform
This is the actual reform enacted in 1995 by the Dini government. As de-
scribed in sections 6.2 and 6.3, at the steady state this reform would repre-
sent a radical departure from the baseline in all respects. By introducing a
notionally deﬁned contribution method of calculation of beneﬁts, it im-
plies a potential reduction in the present value of beneﬁts for many work-
ers. It also introduces actuarial principles in the beneﬁt computation for-
mula, as well as indexation to prices. The rules that this reform envisages
(we stress, at the steady state) are not dissimilar from those proposed by the
common reform (R3). Results are shown in ﬁgures 6.22–6.28.
Figure 6.24 shows the age distribution of exit probabilities. These are all
shifted to older ages, both because we impose that people cannot retire be-
fore age 57 and because incentives are such that it is optimal to postpone
retirement. The reduction in gross beneﬁts is substantial at ages 50 to 60
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Table 6.7 Decomposition of the eﬀects of the Dini Reform




Beneﬁts –68,054 –1,890 –69,944
Taxes: Total –13,953 27,045 13,093
Net change –54,101 –28,935 –83,037
Change as % of base beneﬁts –32.2 –17.2 –49.4
Option value—Age dummies
Beneﬁts –67,114 –2,142 –69,256
Taxes: Total –13,895 26,326 12,431
Net change –53,219 –28,468 –81,687
Change as % of base beneﬁts –31.9 –17.1 –49.0Fig. 6.22 Common Reform—Option value, SSW by age of labor force exit (OV
age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.23 Common Reform—Option value, taxes by age of labor force exit (OV
age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.24 1995 Reform (Dini Reform)—Option value, distribution by age of labor
force exits (OV age dummies)
Note: Values in percentage terms.Fig. 6.25 1995 Reform (Dini Reform)—Option value, SSW by age of labor
force exit
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.26 1995 Reform (Dini Reform)—Option value, ﬁscal implications of Dini
Reform as a percentage of GDP
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Fig. 6.27 1995 Reform (Dini Reform)—Option value, total eﬀect by age of retire-
ment (OV age dummies)
Note: Values in euros of 2001.(ﬁgure 6.25). As a result, gross beneﬁts are reduced by 41.53 percent and
taxes increase by 16.24 percent (table 6.8). This is due both to a substantial
mechanical eﬀect (–31.9 percent) and to a marked behavioral eﬀect (–17.1
percent), which produce a net eﬀect of –49 percent of beneﬁts. The bulk of
the losses is concentrated in the age group 50 to 56, while the older group
experiences a gain in terms of gross beneﬁts, largely oﬀset by an increase
in taxes (ﬁgure 6.27). In terms of private sector GDP, this reform would
imply a gain for the government budget of approximately 1.6 percent.
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Fig. 6.28 1995 Reform (Dini Reform)—Option value, taxes by age of labor 
force exit
Note: Values in euros of 2001.
Table 6.8 Total ﬁscal impact of the Dini Reform
Total change 
Present discounted value relative to base (%)
Base Dini Reform Dini Reform
Peak value—Age dummies
Beneﬁts 168,016 98,072 –41.63
Taxes
Payroll 32,398 49,780 53.65
Income 25,847 23,411 –9.43
VAT 16,879 15,026 –10.98
Total 75,124 88,217 17.43
Option value—Age dummies
Beneﬁts 166,778 97,522 –41.53
Taxes
Payroll 33,387 50,309 50.69
Income 26,214 23,617 –9.91
VAT 16,949 15,054 –11.18
Total 76,549 88,980 16.24The distributional impact of the reform is somewhat perverse in our sim-
ulation, as the highest social security wealth quintile gains from the reform
while all the rest of the cohort suﬀers a loss, particularly the median group
(table 6.9).
6.6 Conclusions
The reform process that many advocate for the Italian social security
system has rarely been analyzed with microdata. On the other hand, the
few econometric studies available do not consider the total budgetary im-
plications of the proposed pension reforms. In this chapter, we oﬀer a novel
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Table 6.9 Distributional analysis of the Dini Reform model with age dummies
Change relative 
Present discounted value to base PDV
Base Dini Reform Dini Reform
Quintile 5 (highest)
Beneﬁts 13,185 8,759 –4,426
After-tax income 11,839 8,013 –3,826
Taxes
Payroll 3,550 5,133 1,583
Income 4,283 4,346 63
VAT 1,348 1,298 –51
Total 9,181 1,323 –7,858
Net change 3,432
Change as % of base beneﬁts 26.03
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 10,429 5,362 –5,067
Taxes: Total 4,474 1,226 –3,248
Net change –1,820
Change as % of base beneﬁts –17.45
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 8,344 4,466 –3,879
Taxes: Total 2,840 591 –2,249
Net change –1,629
Change as % of base beneﬁts –19.53
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 5,970 3,373 –2,597
Taxes: Total 1,785 258 –1,527
Net change –1,070
Change as % of base beneﬁts –17.92
Quintile 1 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 3,769 2,435 –1,334
Taxes: Total 876 74 –802
Net change –532
Change as % of base beneﬁts –14.12approach to evaluating reforms that derives the entire range of ﬁscal im-
plications by taking behavioral eﬀects into account.
Our work builds on the econometric estimates in Brugiavini and Perac-
chi (2004), based on a longitudinal sample of private sector employees pro-
vided by the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS). A new release
of the data allows us to employ a richer model, also brieﬂy described in this
chapter.
The simulation exercise considers three hypothetical reforms plus the ac-
tual reform introduced in Italy in 1995 (the so-called Dini Reform). These
reforms are evaluated against a baseline represented by the pre-1992 sys-
tem. The hypothetical reforms range from marginal variation of the status
quo to an ideal system. The ﬁrst regime change (R1) is a shift of three years
in all retirement ages, the second (R2) proposes an actuarial adjustment to
beneﬁts such that early retirement is discouraged while providing incen-
tives to delay exits. A reform common to all countries participating to the
project (R3) allows us to evaluate the eﬀects of a regime change that is quite
radical in the Italian case, as it implies a sharp beneﬁt cut, an actuarial ad-
justment, and a change in the indexation rules. Finally, a full application of
the Dini Reform (R4) changes many features of the current system. In par-
ticular, it introduces a notionally deﬁned contribution method of beneﬁts
computation. In several dimensions, this actual reform shows similarities
with the hypothetical Common Reform.
The simulations are carried out by focusing on the cohorts of workers
born in the years 1938, 1939, and 1940. For these workers, we construct
measures of all the variables of interest, including projected probabilities
of retirement under each policy regime.
Analyzing the three hypothetical reforms against the baseline, we ﬁnd
that even a modest change in the eﬀective retirement age would imply non-
negligible eﬀects. Measured as a percentage of prereform gross beneﬁts,
losses for the workers in our cohorts are approximately 17 percent. Gross-
ing up to the population size of the cohorts considered, and measuring as
a percentage of the Italian output, this change is equivalent to approxi-
mately 0.5 percent of the GDP produced in 2001 by the private sector. The
losses for retirees represent savings for the government budget that come
through a reduction in beneﬁt outlays and increases in social security con-
tributions, income tax revenue, and VAT revenue.
The Actuarial Reform and the Common Reform are particularly inter-
esting for the Italian case. The former introduces in the baseline (pre-1993)
regime an actuarial adjustment, leaving unaﬀected all other aspects of the
social security system. This change has some eﬀects on the age distribution
of retirement rates, as workers tend to delay retirement. Coupled with the
actual reduction of beneﬁts that the reform envisages for younger retirees,
we obtain a net total eﬀect of –12.1 percent of baseline gross beneﬁts. In
terms of GDP, the revenue gains are of the order of 0.4 percentage points.
290 Agar Brugiavini and Franco PeracchiThe Common Reform reduces the probability of exit at younger ages and
shifts the distribution of retirement rates toward older ages. Gross beneﬁts
are much lower at all ages, particularly at ages 50 to 60. The total impact
on gross beneﬁts is huge, but due to a reduction in the total tax burden, the
overall net eﬀect is a loss to workers of 51.1 percent relative to the baseline
case. This is almost completely explained by the mechanical eﬀect, which
swamps the small gain due to delayed retirement. The total eﬀect is quite
sizeable in the aggregate: ﬁscal authorities would gain approximately 1.6
percent of GDP.
Finally, the Dini Reform of 1995 also introduces radical changes in the
Italian pension system. In our simulations, this reform is evaluated at its
steady state. The age distribution of retirement rates is shifted toward older
ages, both because workers cannot retire before age 57 and because incen-
tives are such that it is optimal to postpone retirement. The reduction in
gross beneﬁts, leading to an almost uniform distribution of beneﬁts under
the new regime, is substantial at ages 50 to 60. Overall, the net eﬀect is a 49
percent beneﬁt loss for workers in the chosen cohorts. If fully implemented
in 2001, this reform would imply a gain for the government budget equal to
about 1.6 percent of private sector GDP.
The general conclusion is that, in Italy, there is still room for reforms able
to generate nonnegligible savings for the government budget. Some of
these reforms would also have desirable properties in terms of redistribu-
tion between generations, and between rich and poor retirees. Further re-
search is needed to assess the eﬀects of these reforms for a larger number
of cohorts and to analyze the distributional impact of the regime changes
in several dimensions.
Appendix
The Treatment of Taxes and Contributions
We have made use of four diﬀerent types of taxes. These are estimated
for the years 1973 to 1996 (the period in which we observe the real labor
force exit) and then projected twenty years forward.
First we use contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by both the employee
and the employer. The source is INPS (www.inps.it/Doc/Professionista/
aliquote/aliquote.htm) for the years 1991 to 2000. For the years between
1973 and 1990 we refer to “Relazione Generale sulla Situazione Econom-
ica del Paese,” published by Ministero della Programmazione Economica
e del Tesoro. The contribution rate paid by employees increases every year,
from 0.0635 of gross earnings in 1973 to 0.0889 in 1999. The rate paid by
employers increases from 0.1345 to 0.2381 in 1999.
Fiscal Implications of Pension Reforms in Italy 291Next we use income taxes, both for earnings and for pensions. In Italy,
there are several income brackets attracting diﬀerent tax rates (see “Testo
Unico delle Imposte sui Redditi”). From 1974 to 1982 we could count 32
income brackets, which we grouped into nine groups in order to compare
with the legislation of the 1990s. We also modify the tax rates accordingly
(these range from 10 percent to approximately 60 percent). In this dataset
we have also included rates to calculate the deductions for employees and
pensioners. There are diﬀerent deduction values for every income bracket
and for every year.
The third type of taxes are Value Added Taxes (VAT), which would be
collected on expenditures. There are mainly four VAT tax rates, which ap-
ply to diﬀerent goods and services. We create a basket of goods and ser-
vices with a related price index. From this we infer an average VAT rate to
be applied on expenditures. This has been changing every year: the order
of magnitude is 0.09089 in 1982; 0.09521 in 1983; 0.10763 until 1993, and
then it decreases slightly. As we only observe earnings in our data, we cal-
culate the total value of this tax as a percentage of earnings, taking account
of the average propensity to consume. This is approximately 70 percent of
income, which is about 55 percent of earnings.
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